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In this brief reaction, I offer some comments on Professor Yackee’s excellent note, Do
states bargain over investor-state dispute settlement? Or, toward greater collaboration in
the study of bilateral investment treaties.1 I join his call for more empirical and
interdisciplinary research in the field of international investment law and I argue
against perpetrating the quantitative/qualitative divide in empirical legal research
generally. Qualitative data, when obtained and analyzed in rigorous ways, can be as
revealing as quantitative analysis. Interviews and other similar data collection strategies
are very relevant and often an important departure point in every empirical inquiry.
Hence—when possible— surveys and case studies should be used in complementary ways
for improving empirical legal studies in international investment law.
* * *
Professor Yackee is a rising star among the empirical legal community and an
established scholar in the field of international investment law, with a delightful and
clear style. In his piece reproduced in this volume, Professor Yackee reminds us of the
benefits and perils of empiricism in legal scholarship and advocates for greater
collaboration between lawyers, legal scholars, and social scientists.2
When it is well done, empirical research may reveal unexpected, often counterintuitive relationships that challenge the beliefs and assumptions of legal scholars (e.g.,
the relationship of crime rates and tough laws)3. This type of research may also settle
normative arguments that scholars have at times spent years arguing for or against (e.g.,
the existence of racial discrimination in death penalty convictions),4 or reject false claims
about causation between two phenomena (e.g., that more guns yield less crime).5
However, when done poorly, either by legal scholars without proper methodological
training, by social scientists with insufficient understanding of the law or the legal field,
or by scholars lacking both, empirical research may lead to wrong and even potentially
disastrous prescriptions.6 As Alan O. Sykes—a giant in the field of international
economic law—once told his class about a seemingly promising empirical paper: some
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empirical legal studies may show how knowing a little bit of two disciplines can be a bad
combination.
As observed by Professor Yackee, scholars interested in legal questions with different
disciplinary backgrounds often do not interact with each other, let alone with lawyers,
but they share the goal of deploying empirical evidence to understand legal systems and
legal behavior.7 Although empirical legal scholars may use different sorts of data,
different methods of data collection, and different analytic approaches, they all face the
challenges of empirical research design: identifying research questions, selecting
appropriate methods for answering those questions, gathering and managing valid data,
conducting rigorous analyses, and interpreting the results in a way that is faithful to the
evidence.8
Professor Yackee reminds us of a very practical way in which those not trained in
modern statistical methods have the capacity to contribute in meaningful ways to
empirical research without turning themselves into quants. He does so by showing how
in creating “measurements,” scholars may hide or decontextualize a phenomenon.
Similarly, variables good for regression analysis may also hide the complexity of what is
often referred to as the law in action (i.e., how rules arise and operate in the real world).9
More importantly, Professor Yackee reminds us that the conversation in empirical
legal research is not a one-way street: as legal academicians should use the advice of
social scientists for good, valid, and replicable empirical legal research, social scientists
should likewise refrain from law-related research without understanding the malleability
of the law and its instrumental, often strategic use. 10 In other ways, interdisciplinary
empirical legal research is a two-way or sometimes multiple-way street that leads to
better understanding of legal systems, legal behavior, and how law is implicated in our
social life, more generally.
I couldn’t agree more with this view. Moreover, Professor Yackee’s example is
convincing and elegant: a dependent variable (the outcome of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) negotiations) constructed by two political scientists without deep
understanding of how litigants perceive and assess dispute settlement choices, how elites
are involved in negotiation approach treaty drafting, or the historical evolution of
international investment dispute settlement system, may surely render meaningless
results regarding the basic underlying mechanism of treaty bargains.11 In this basic
example, consulting a lawyer at a firm with expertise in the field would have confirmed

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 281-83.
See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER, RESEARCH METHODS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: A PRIMER FOR
LAWYERS, (2001).
Stewart Macaulay, Wisconsin’s Legal Tradition, Speaking to Benchers before Receiving
Brazeau Professorship (1994), in 24 Gargoyle, Issue 3, 6-10.
Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 279.
Id. at 283-87.

319

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (2013)

that having the option of a number of forums tends to be better than no option; asking a
lawyer at the State Department of the United States would have confirmed that
alternatives to ICSID are especially important when a country is not a party to the
ICSID Convention; and asking a member of ICSID’s Secretariat would have helped to
confirm that decisions such as Klöeckner,12 Fedax,13 or Mafezzini14 have changed the way
lawyers assess dispute settlement options, or how since Argentina’s disputes, or the
creation of the Additional Facility, ICSID’s value as a dispute resolution forum has been
reassessed.15 The example is wonderful because it illustrates—in very simple and
intuitive terms—the important role of lawyers and legal scholars in quantitative
empirical research.
Perhaps where I take a small departure from Professor Yackee’s main point is by
suggesting that empirical legal studies be defined more broadly. Quants are only part of
the empirical legal community with whom lawyers and legal scholars can and should
attempt to collaborate. Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as quantitative
research, and provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal behavior. Qualitative
descriptive research methods lend themselves to narrative analyses rather than
statistical analysis, are well suited to studies that chronicle the design and
implementation of new programs or negotiations (e.g., legislative histories, process
evaluations or treaty bargains), and investigate the dynamics of decision-making, conflict
resolution, and litigation. It is in this area where lawyers and legal scholars, often
passionate about legal minutia, constantly aware of the strategic use of the law,
observant of details, may contribute more frequently and perhaps more effectively with
empirical scholarship.
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In my view, a narrow definition of empirical research may reflect a general trend in
our contemporary culture to often regard quantitative data as inherently more objective
than qualitative data, hence a tendency to define quantitative data as “empirical,” and
qualitative data as not. This is a true trend in legal academia.16 However, the results of
qualitative empirical research are valuable, and when done well, can be equally
revealing.
* * *
The value of qualitative data could be illustrated with the following example. As
described by Professor Yackee, Professors “Allee and Peinhardt code the strength of ISDS
provisions (their dependent variable) by noting the dispute settlement to which each BIT
grants investors access. They also collect a number of independent variables measuring
concepts related to the strength of home state preferences for strong ISDS, the strength
of host state preferences for weak ISDS, and the balance of bargaining power between
home and host states.” 17 From this, it is clear that the authors of the paper started with
a theory in mind, with—perhaps—minor (or no) input from those involved in negotiating
BITs (i.e., government representatives and negotiators) from “powerful capital exporters”
or “weaker capital importers” countries.18 This input could be easily obtained through
interviews and should have preceded any “Big Data” collection (e.g., categorizing
outcomes of treaty negotiations). This simple exercise could be key to specify the model (a
theory about what is causing what), which –at the same time—could impact the
assessment of the data needed to create the analyzed variables.
Perhaps due to the methodological training of Allee and Peinhardt (i.e., political
science) the authors seem to be concerned with a question of geopolitical power, or
bargaining power. 19 However, let’s assume that the Mexican Chief Negotiator during the
interviews mentions that after NAFTA the same ISDS provisions (again, their dependent
variable) are often replicated for “convenience.” The Chief Negotiator explains to the
interviewee that for the Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Negociaciones
(Mexican BITs negotiators) it is easier to specialize in one type of treaty model. In other
words, whether Mexican negotiators are on the “offensive side” (trying to protect Mexican
investors abroad) or the “defensive side” (preventing the sacrificing of sovereignty to
ISDS tribunals) the institution has made a policy choice. She also explains that after
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NAFTA in 1993,20 the same provisions were included in the Mexico-Columbia-Venezuela
FTA (G3) in 1994 21 and, among many others, the Japan-Mexico FTA in 2004.22 The
researchers then could assess this key fact and, if the question of bargaining power
remains of interest, try to include it in the model (for instance, by controlling how prior or
extremely relevant negotiations may affect prospective outcomes). If that was the case,
the researcher could specify a model that is less concerned with bargaining power and
more concerned with diffusion, or how some dispute settlement options spread over a
network of treaties.
This is not to say that the research of Allee and Peinhardt is not valuable. It is very
much so. However, it could be even more valuable if in addition to the laborious
statistical analysis could be complemented with a case study of an actual treaty
negotiation (or law in action). It is probably true that bargaining power has something to
say about treaty outcomes, but how and when is not clear. It is in this that lawyers not
trained in quantitative methods also could help to improve the ways in which
methodologically sophisticated social scientists translate legal phenomena into the
numerical categories and values that make statistical analysis possible.
While some empiricists may have a preference for some methodological approaches,
all have the duty not to perpetuate the quantitative/qualitative divide. The decision
whether to rely on qualitative or quantitative data in an empirical analysis should be
based primarily on the nature of the questions asked and the analysis intended. And
when appropriate, a combination of methodologies may be the most powerful. As
Lawrence Friedman, a pioneer in the field of legal studies once told me: “Qualitative
analysis without quantitative evidence tends to be entertaining anecdotes; quantitative
analysis without qualitative data is often blind.”23
Therefore, whether assisting quants in creative adequate variables or measurements
that reflect the complexity of the law in action, or designing and executing case studies to
understand a social phenomenon in context without losing sight of the details and
nuances that the more standardized survey approach neglects, law professors should
embrace, and not shy away from empiricism. This is, I believe, an important note to
motivate more to join the empirical community.
* * *
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I want to conclude by joining Professor Yackee in his call for more empirical and
interdisciplinary research in our field. As well pointed in his paper, two lines of research
dominate the empirical studies in international investment law.24 On the one hand,
studies that use BITs as independent variables, most commonly, looking at whether the
treaties cause increases in foreign direct investment. On the other hand BITs as
dependent variables, or research attempting to explain why states sign BITs. 25 This is, I
argue, the result of a limited understanding of the goals of modern international
investment law.
To increase the possibilities for empirical investigations in the field I’ve argued
elsewhere that we should understand three different historical motivations for investorstate arbitration and BITs, or modern international investment law: specialization of
international investment dispute settlement, de-politicization of inter-state relations,
and stabilization of economic policy. These three sources are concerned with specific long
and short-term outcomes, are susceptible to critiques posed by diverse theoretical
approaches to international law, and therefore, compel scholars to perform new and
different empirical assessments. Understanding these three sources can substantially
progress and also shift the focus to new empirical questions in the field.26
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